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Abstract
To limit disclosures, statistical agencies and other data disseminators can release partially synthetic,
public use microdata sets. These comprise the units originally surveyed, but some collected values,
for example sensitive values at high risk of disclosure or values of key identiﬁers, are replaced with
multiple draws from statistical models. Because the original records are on the ﬁle, there remain risks
of identiﬁcations. In this paper, we describe how to evaluate identiﬁcation disclosure risks in partially
synthetic data, accounting for released information from the multiple datasets, the model used to generate
synthetic values, and the approach used to select values to synthesize. We illustrate the computations
using the Survey of Youths in Custody.
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1 INTRODUCTION
To limit the risks of disclosures when releasing data on individual records, statistical agencies can release
multiply-imputed, partially synthetic data. These comprise the units originally surveyed with some collected
values, e.g. sensitive values at high risk of disclosure or values of key identiﬁers, replaced with multiple impu-
tations. Partially synthetic, public use data sets are in the development stage for the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, the Longitudinal Business Database, the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynam-
ics survey, and the American Communities Survey group quarters data. For other examples and discussions
of partially synthetic data, see Little (1993), Kennickell (1997) Abowd and Woodcock (2001, 2004), Reiter
(2004b, 2005c), Abowd and Lane (2004), Little et al. (2004), and Mitra and Reiter (2006).
To illustrate the general idea of partial synthesis, we adapt the setting of Reiter (2004a). Suppose the
agency has collected data on a random sample of people. The data comprise each person’s age, race, sex,
and income. Some intruder, who knows values of age, race, and sex for individuals in the sample, wants to
identify individuals by matching on age, race, and sex. Suppose the agency wants disguise the identities of all
people to discourage this linking. To do so, the agency might replace the actual race and sex (and possibly
age) values for those people with simulated values. Speciﬁcally, the agency estimates the joint distribution
of race and sex, conditional on age and income, and samples new values of race and sex for the sampled
people. The distribution is estimated using the collected data and other relevant information. The result is
one synthetic data set. The agency repeats this process, i.e. draws new values of race and sex, m times to
generate m synthetic data sets. These m data sets are then released to the public.
Because the replacement values are simulated from probability models, the relationships among the
variables should be preserved on average, provided the models reasonably describe the data. The “on
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1average” caveat is important: parameter estimates from any one simulated data set are unlikely to equal
exactly those from the observed data. The synthetic parameter estimates are subject to two sources of
variation, namely sampling the collected data and simulating the replacement values. It is not possible to
estimate the the latter source of variation from only one released synthetic data set. However, it is possible
to do so from multiple synthetic data sets, which explains why multiple synthetic data sets are released.
To account for both sources of variability, the user estimates parameters and their variances in each of the
synthetic data sets, and combines these results using simple formulas described by Reiter (2003, 2005b). The
analyst uses standard methods and software to obtain estimates in each synthetic data set.
The protection aﬀorded by partially synthetic data depends on the nature of the synthesis. Replacing
key identiﬁers with imputations makes it diﬃcult for users to know the values of the original values of
those identiﬁers, which reduces the chance of identiﬁcations. Replacing values of sensitive variables makes
it diﬃcult for users to learn the exact values of those variables, which can prevent attribute disclosures.
Nonetheless, partially synthetic data sets remain susceptible to disclosure risks. The originally sampled
units remain in the released ﬁles, albeit with some values changed, leaving values that users can utilize for
record linkages. Furthermore, the intruder can utilize the multiple copies of the synthetic values, as well as
any released meta-data about how they were generated, in disclosure attacks.
This paper describes some approaches that intruders might use to attempt identiﬁcations in partially
synthetic data. It proposes a general framework for quantifying the identiﬁcation disclosure risks inherent in
releasing partially synthetic data. The framework accounts for (i) the information existing in all the released
synthetic data sets, (ii) various assumptions about intruder knowledge and behavior, and (iii) the details
released about the synthetic data generation model. The approach is illustrated on a genuine, partially
synthesized data set.
2 Risk measure
To describe the framework, we compute probabilities of identiﬁcation, conditional on the released data. This
was ﬁrst proposed by Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989) and has been extended by Fienberg et al. (1997)
and Reiter (2005a).
For a collection of n sampled units, let yjk be the collected data for unit j on variable k, for k = 0,...,p
and j = 1,...,n. The column k = 0 contains unique unit identiﬁers, such as names or social security
numbers, and is never released by the agency. It is convenient to split yj = (yj1,...,yjp) into two sets of
variables. Let yjA be the vector of variables available to users from external databases, such as demographic
or geographic attributes. And, let yjU be the vector of variables that are available to users only in the
released data. The compositions of A and U are determined by the agency based on knowledge of what
information exists in external databases. It is assumed that A and U are the same for all units in the sample.
The agency releases l = 1,...,m partially synthetic data sets including all n sampled units. Let z
(l)
jk
be the released value for unit j on variable k in partially synthetic data set l. We assume that the agency
synthesizes values only in A to prevent re-identiﬁcations. Let z
(l)
jA and zjU = yjU be the released values
of the available variables and unavailable variables, respectively, for unit j in partially synthetic data set
l. The sets A and U are the same as those used to partition the yj. The available variables can be
further divided into z
(l)
jA = (z
(l)
jS,zjD). The z
(l)
jS comprises variables in A whose values are replaced with
synthetic data drawn from probability distributions. The zjD comprises variables in A whose values are
not synthesized, for example available variables for which zjk = yjk or available variables that are re-coded.
Let zjS =
￿
z
(1)
jS ,z
(2)
jS ,...,z
(m)
jS
￿
; let ZS be the collection of zjS for all n units in the sample; let ZD be the
collection of zjD for all n units in the sample; and, let Z be all released data. Finally, let YS be all n units’
original values of the variables that were synthesized.
2The agency generating synthetic data might release meta-data about the synthesis process to help analysts
determine if their analyses are reasonably supported in the synthetic data. Let M represent the meta-data
released about the models used to generate the synthetic data. The M could include, for example, the
code for the models used to generate the synthetic data. Let R represent the meta-data released about
why records were selected for synthesis. For example, R could specify that all records that are uniques and
duplicates with respect to yA undergo synthesis. Either M or R could be empty.
The intruder has a vector of information, t, on a particular target unit in the population which may or
may not correspond to a unit in Z. The column k = 0 in t contains a unique identiﬁer for that record. The
intruder’s goal is to match unit j in Z to the target when zj0 = t0, and not to match when zj0  = t0 for
any j ∈ Z. We assume that t has some of the same variables as Z—otherwise there is little opportunity for
the intruder to match—and we allow t to include partial information on values. For example, an intruder’s
t can include the information that the income for some unit j is above $100,000, even though the intruder
does not know the unit’s exact income. The variables of t that correspond to the variables in zS are written
as tS. As done by Fienberg et al. (1997), we assume that t = yjA for some unit j in the population,
although not necessarily for a unit in Z. That is, relative to the sampled values, the intruder’s values are
not measured with error. This assumption may not be true in practice, but it provides upper limits on the
identiﬁcation probabilities and greatly simpliﬁes calculations. Finally, we assume that users can correctly
link the records across synthetic data sets, for example by using record numbers (if released) or by matching
on non-synthesized values in each Z(l).
Let J be a random variable that equals j when zj0 = t0 for j ∈ Z and equals n + 1 when zj0 = t0 for
some j  ∈ Z. The intruder thus seeks to calculate the Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R) for j = 1,...,n+1. The intruder
then decides whether or not the maximum of the identiﬁcation probabilities for j = 1,...,n is large enough
to declare an identiﬁcation. Because the intruder does not know the actual values in YS, the intruder should
integrate over its possible values when computing the match probabilities. Hence, we have
Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R) =
Z
Pr(J = j|t,Z,YS,M,R)Pr(YS|t,Z,M,R)dYS. (1)
These probabilities can be determined from assumptions about the knowledge and behavior of the intruder,
as we now discuss.
2.1 Evaluating Pr(J = j|t,Z,YS,M,R)
Given Ys, the intruder would toss out the synthetic data, ZS, and use (ZD,YS) to attempt re-identiﬁcations.
We assume that the unavailable variables do not help with re-identiﬁcations given (ZD,YS). Hence, we have
Pr(J = j|t,Z,YS,M,R) = Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS). (2)
For any variable k in zjD, when the value of tk is not consistent with the value of the released zjk, the
Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS) = 0. For example, suppose t belongs to a 37 year old, married woman. When sex is
not altered, all males have Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS) = 0. When age is released in ﬁve year intervals rather than
exact integers, all people with ages outside 35 to 39 have zero probabilities.
For variables in zjS, the intruder’s actions depend on the nature of the variables. For categorical variables,
the intruder treats the yjS as if it were a part of zjD; that is, he matches directly on yjS. For example, if
marital status is synthesized, all women whose marital status in YS diﬀers from married have zero probabil-
ities. For numerical or continuous variables, the intruder also could seek an exact match. However, because
the intruder must estimate the values in YS, his estimates are very likely to diﬀer from the corresponding
values in tS. This would lead to zero probabilities for most if not all of the records in Z. Alternatively,
the intruder can assign zero probabilities to all but a set of plausible matches. For example, among all
3candidate records for which the categorical portions of t and (zjD,yjS) match exactly, the intruder can
deﬁne plausible matches as those record(s) whose numerical components of yjS are within some acceptable
Euclidean or Mahalanobis distance from the corresponding tS. All units not in the set of plausible matches
have zero probabilities.
When t is known to belong to a unit in Z, for example when all records of a census are released or when
another version of the data set has been previously released, the Pr(J = n + 1|t,ZD,YS) = 0. And, for
j ≤ n, the Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS) = 1/nt, where nt is the number of units in (ZD,YS) with yjA consistent
with t, either as exact or plausible matches. When nt = 0 in this setting, which occurs when no values in
(ZD,YS) match the corresponding values in t, we set Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS) = 1/n∗
t, where n∗
t is the number
of units in ZD with zjD consistent with tD.
It may be prudent to assume the intruder knows particular target units are in Z, even when the collected
data are not a census. For example, in a survey of households, neighbors may know that an interviewer
visited a sampled household. Since all records in the sample are included in Z, the neighbors know that
household must be in Z. Alternatively, someone with inside information about which units are in the released
data may attempt to discredit the agency. Even when knowledge that particular targets are in Z is diﬃcult
to come by, setting Pr(J = n+1|t,ZD,YS) = 0 results in conservative measures of identiﬁcation disclosure
risks.
The calculations are more complicated when Pr(J = n + 1|t,ZD,YS)  = 0. Let Nt be the number
of units in the population that would have (zjD,yjS) consistent with t if they were included in Z. Then,
Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS) = 1/Nt for units whose (zjD,YjS) are consistent with t, and Pr(J = n+1|t,ZD,YS) =
(Nt − nt)/Nt. The agency, and the intruder, may be able to determine Nt from census totals, particularly
when ZA contains only categorical, demographic characteristics. When Nt is not known, it must be estimated
from available sources. One approach is to set Nt equal to the sum of the survey weights for all units in Z
whose (zjD,yjS) are consistent with t. The survey-weighted estimate could poorly estimate Nt, especially
when units like t are rare in the collected data. Alternatively, Nt can be estimated using model-based
approaches, such as those used to estimate the number of population uniques. These include, among others,
Bethlehem et al. (1990), Greenberg and Zayatz (1992), Skinner (1992), Skinner et al. (1994), Chen and
Keller-McNulty (1998), Fienberg and Makov (1998), Samuels (1998), Pannekoek (1999), Dale and Elliot
(2001), and Elamir and Skinner (2006). If ZA contains no variables, the Pr(J = j|t) = 1/N for j ≤ n, and
Pr(J = n + 1|t) = (N − n)/N, where N is the number of units in the population.
2.2 Evaluating Pr(YS|t,Z,M,R)
The construction in (1) suggests a Monte Carlo approach to estimating the Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R). First, we
sample a value of YS from Pr(YS|t,Z,M,R). Let Ynew represent one set of simulated values. Second,
using the values of the Nt and nt computed from Ynew, we compute Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS = Ynew,M,R) as
described in Section 2.1. We iterate this two-step process I times, where ideally h is large, and estimate the
quantity in (1) as the average of the resultant h values of Pr(J = j|t,ZD,YS = Ynew,M,R).
The key to this step is the model used to generate the plausible values of YS. Here the details in M and
R play central roles. We consider three scenarios about M and R that are representative of what might occur
in practice. First, the agency releases nothing about the synthetic data generation process, i.e. M and R are
empty. Second, the agency releases the exact speciﬁcation of the models without parameter estimates and
releases nothing about why records are selected for synthesis, i.e. M has information and R is empty. Third,
the agency releases the exact speciﬁcation of the models including posterior distributions of the parameter
estimates and explains why records are selected for synthesis, i.e. M and R have complete information.
There are other possibilities, but these examples illustrate the computations.
When M and R are empty, the intruder’s primary source of information about the YS is the ZS. One
approach is to treat the values in ZS as equally likely, plausible values of YS. That is, the intruder can
4assume that, for l = 1,...,m, the Pr(YS = Z
(l)
S |t,Z,M,R) = 1/m. The values of the Z
(l)
S are used to
compute each Pr(J = j|t,ZD,Z
(l)
S ). Alternatively, for any synthesized categorical variable k, the intruder
can set yjk equal to the most frequent value in zjk. If several values are tied for the maximum frequency,
the intruder can pick one z
(l)
jk at random from these tied values. In this approach, the intruder only uses the
most frequent values in Pr(J = j|t,Z,YS), ignoring the uncertainty in the estimate of YS.
The intruder might have prior knowledge about the relationships between YS and the other components
of Y. Of course, there are inﬁnite numbers of representations of intruder knowledge. To simplify the
problem, we adopt the conservative assumption that the intruder with prior knowledge uses the same form
of the model for YS as was used to generate ZS, without knowing the parameter estimates for that model.
Equivalently, we assume that scenarios where the intruder has prior knowledge are equivalent to scenarios
where the agency releases information about the synthesis model in M, without any parameter estimates.
Agencies may release this information in M anyway as meta-data.
When M includes only the speciﬁcation of the synthesis models, and R is empty, the intruder can ﬁt
the models with Z to estimate the posterior distributions of the model parameters. Using these posterior
distributions, the intruder then repeatedly simulates values of YS using predictive simulation. That is, the
intruder samples values of the parameters from their posterior distribution, then samples values of Ynew
using the sampled parameters and the imputation models described in M. Alternatively, to streamline the
computations, the intruder might ignore the uncertainty in the parameter estimates and use their average
across the m data sets in the predictive distribution for simulating Ynew. For either strategy, the intruder
uses the simulated Ynew when computing each Pr(J = j|t,Z,Ynew). The role of the number of synthetic
data sets is apparent in this setting: as m increases, the uncertainty in the parameter estimates decreases,
which in turn should decrease variability in the Ynew and improve the matching.
When the agency releases complete information about the synthesis, so that M includes the posterior
distributions of the parameters of the synthesis models, the intruder does not need to estimate models
with Z. Instead, the predictive simulations are based on draws from the released posterior distributions
or, streamlining computations, based on the released posterior modes of these distributions. There is no
additional uncertainty due to estimating parameters with ﬁnite m. In fact, the magnitude of m is irrelevant
when M includes complete information about the synthesis.
The details about R impact the plausibility of certain values of YS. The intruder can eliminate values of
YS that correspond to values inconsistent with R. This can be done via prior distributions in the predictive
simulations. For example, if the agency releases the fact that only minorities’ races were synthesized, the
intruder can force the prior probability of non-minority race to equal zero when simulating Ynew. Or, if
the agency reveals that only sample unique records undergo synthesis, the intruder can place zero prior
probability on simulating combinations of (ZD,Ynew) equal to the YA of unaltered records and force all
simulated records to be unique.
In some applications, the information in R may not be especially helpful for identiﬁcations. For example,
if the agency simulates all values of sex and race, the R provides no additional information over what is
released in (Z,M). As another example, suppose the agency simulates all combinations of identiﬁers that
appear no more than ﬁve times. With suﬃciently large dimensions of zjS, intruders may not gain much by
building that prior information into the predictive simulations.
3 Illustrative Example
To illustrate the computations of identiﬁcation disclosure risk, we synthesize data from the 1987 Survey of
Youth in Custody (Lohr, 1999). This survey was used by Mitra and Reiter (2006) to illustrate the role of
survey weights in partially synthetic data. The survey interviewed youths in juvenile institutions about their
family background, previous criminal history, and drug and alcohol use. The survey contains 2621 youths
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cleaning (Mitra and Reiter, 2006), we deleted all the youths in four facilities, leaving a total of 2562 youths.
We suppose that the set A, i.e. the variables known by the intruder, contains the youth’s facility (46
levels), race (ﬁve levels), and ethnicity (two levels). We suppose that all other variables are in the set U, i.e.
available to users only in the released data. There are 64 youths who have unique combinations of facility,
race, and sex.
To reduce the risk of identiﬁcations, we synthesize all values of facility and race, without altering other
variables. We ﬁrst synthesize facility using multinomial regressions that include all other variables as predic-
tors, except race and some variables that cause multi-collinearity. We then synthesize race using multinomial
regressions that include all other variables plus indicator variables for facilities as predictors, except those
that cause multicollinearity. The new values of race are simulated conditional on the values of the synthetic
facility indicators.
We suppose that intruders know the values of facility, race, and ethnicity for all units in the survey
and would like to identify records from the synthetic data sets. That is, for all targets t in the sample, we
assume the Pr(J = 2562+ 1|t,ZD,YS) = 0. For any t in the sample, we compute Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R) for
j = 1,...,n. We assume each target’s probability is computed independently of other targets’ probabilities,
i.e. we match with replacement. We determine risk measures for the entire data set using the functions of
these match probabilities proposed by Reiter (2005a). The ﬁrst measure, which we call perceived match risk,
equals the number of target records for which the highest value of Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R), where 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
exceeds some threshold deemed too risky. For illustration, we set this threshold to be 0.20. To describe the
second and third measures, let cj be the number of records in the data set with the highest match probability
for the target tj; let Ij = 1 if the true match is among the cj units and Ij = 0 otherwise; and, let Kj = 1
when cjIj = 1 and Kj = 0 otherwise. The second risk, which we call expected match risk, equals
P
j(1/cj)Ij.
When Ij = 1 and cj > 1, the contribution of unit j to the expected match risk reﬂects the intruder randomly
guessing at the correct match from the cj candidates. The third risk measure, which we call true match risk,
equals
P
j Kj.
We now evaluate the dependence of the disclosure risk on the number of synthetic data sets—setting
m to equal 2, 3, or 10—and the released information about the synthesis models—setting M to be empty,
to provide the exact speciﬁcation of the synthesis models without estimates of the model parameters, or
to provide the exact speciﬁcation models with full information on the posterior distributions of the model
parameters. We do not evaluate the dependence of risk on R, since all records for facility and race are
synthesized. To mimic intruder behavior, we apply the general disclosure attack strategies outlined in
Section 2.1.
When M is empty, we investigate two attack strategies. In the ﬁrst strategy, which we call the probability-
based approach, for each target tj we determine the number of records in each Z(l) with the same values
of facility, race, and ethnicity as tj. We assign equal probability to each of the matches. When there are
no exact matches for record j in Z(l), in that data set we assign equal probability to any records that
share the same ethnicity as the target. Once the probabilities associated with each Z(l) are determined, we
average them across synthetic data sets to obtain each target’s Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R). In the second strategy,
which we call the mode-based approach, for each record j we compute the most frequently occurring values
of facility and race in zjS, treating them as the best guess of the true values. For each target, we then
determine the number of records with synthetic best guesses and ethnicity that exactly match the target’s
values. We assign equal probability to any matches.
When M includes details of the synthesis models but not parameter estimates, the attack strategy
involves repeated simulation of facility and race, YS, using the released synthesis models. We estimate
the parameters of the synthesis models by ﬁtting the models on each Z(l). Speciﬁcally, let β(l) and Σ(l) be
respectively the maximum likelihood estimates of the multinomial regression coeﬃcients and their covariance
6matrix computed from the lth synthetic data set, for l = 1,...,m. Following Reiter (2003, 2005b), let
¯ βm =
m X
l=1
β
(l)/m (3)
¯ Σm =
m X
l=1
Σ(l)/m (4)
Bm =
m X
l=1
(β
(l) − ¯ βm)(β
(l) − ¯ βm)
′/(m − 1) (5)
Tm = ¯ Σm + Bm/m (6)
The point estimate of the regression coeﬃcients equals ¯ βm. The estimate of the covariance associated with
these parameter estimates equals Tm.
With these parameter estimates, the intruder can simulate values of YS in two ways. First, he can
assume that the true coeﬃcients equal ¯ βm, that is ignore uncertainty in the ¯ βm. Second, he can repeatedly
draw values of the coeﬃcients from their posterior distributions. In our setting, we approximate these
posterior distributions as normal distributions with mean ¯ βm and covariance Tm. We investigate both
approaches, simulating h = 100 values of the vector of facilities and races from the synthesis models for each
approach. For each target,we average the match probabilities across the 100 simulated data sets to obtain
Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
When M includes details of the synthesis models and the posterior distributions of the model parameters,
the intruder uses this distribution to simulate values of YS. There is no need to estimate the parameters of
the synthesis models from the Z. As before, the intruder can treat the posterior mode as if it equals the true
values, or the intruder can repeatedly draw values of the model parameters from their posterior distributions.
We investigate both approaches, simulating h = 100 new values of the vector of facilities and races. For each
target, we average the match probabilities across the 100 simulated data sets to obtain Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Table 1 summarizes the risk measures for the diﬀerent scenarios and attack strategies. Results are based
on one simulation run for each scenario. For each level of m, the same synthetic data sets are evaluated
across the three speciﬁcations of M. We generated another set of synthetic data sets for each scenario, and
the general trends in the table hold.
When M is empty, the perceived matching risk decreases with m in the probability-based approach.
This is because each Pr(J = j|t,Z,M,R) is an average of m probabilities, and the variance of any average
decreases as m increases. Put another way, the averages based on small m are noisy estimates of the
corresponding averages based on inﬁnite m, and the chances of getting extreme estimated averages (larger
than 0.20 in this case) decrease with m. This is not the case for the mode-based approach, since there is no
averaging of probabilities. The numbers of expected and true matches for the probability-based approach
exceed those from the mode-based approach for all m. Because of this dominance, for the remainder of this
section we discuss only the probability-based approach when M is empty.
When M includes the synthesis models (with or without parameter estimates), we typically obtain higher
expected and true match rates using point estimates of the parameters than sampling from the posterior
distributions of the parameters, although the diﬀerences are not dramatic. The point estimates are in fact
the maximum likelihood estimates; hence, the observed data values are more likely to be simulated when
using the point estimates than when using drawn parameter values, which could be far from the observed
values. Thus, for the remainder of this section, we discuss only the point-estimate based methods when M
includes the synthesis models.
Table 1 clearly illustrates the impact of releasing additional information about M. The numbers of
expected and true matches are lowest when M is empty and largest when M contains everything. When
7Type of Matching Risk
Information in M Value of m Perceived Expected True
Empty
Probability-based 2 143 17.8 3
3 115 21.9 13
10 12 24.1 24
Mode-based 2 142 11.8 0
3 167 11.6 1
10 142 15.2 2
Synthesis models, no f(β)
Fix β at approximate mode 2 18 30.6 30
3 9 27.7 27
10 4 31.4 31
Simulate β from approximate posterior 2 3 19.0 19
3 1 30.0 30
10 3 29.1 29
Synthesis models and f(β)
Fix β at mode of f(β) – 10 48.2 48
Simulate β from f(β) – 5 39.0 39
Table 1: Summary of risk measures under diﬀerent scenarios for M and m. The β represents the true values
of these parameters in the population, and the f(β) represents the released posterior distribution of the
parameters of the synthesis model.
M is empty, increasing m increases the numbers of expected and true matches. When M includes details
of the synthesis models without parameter estimates, increasing m has unclear impact on risk for these
modest values of m. This suggests that, for these data, the intruder does not gain much information for
attacking when ten rather than two data sets are released. We expect risks to increase as m gets large, since
setting m = ∞—which corresponds to releasing everything in M—results in larger risks than setting m to
be modest.
Most of the true matches are for records without unique combinations of facility, race, and ethnicity.
For example, when using the point estimate approach with M containing everything, only 5 of the 48
true matches are for sample uniques. Not surprisingly, the number of matched uniques is largest when M
includes everything and smallest (typically one match) when M is empty. Hence, even if intruders focus
solely on targets with unique values of tA, the identiﬁcation disclosure risks remain low for this combination
of synthesis strategy and knowledge of the intruder.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As these results indicate, agencies and other data disseminators considering the release of partially synthetic
data should should account for all released information when assessing identiﬁcation disclosure risks. When
the match probabilities are too large, the data disseminator has several options, including synthesizing
more values, reducing m, and restricting the information in M and R. The impacts of these options on
identiﬁcation disclosure risk depends on the particulars of the ﬁle to be protected and disseminated. Further
8empirical studies of the eﬀectiveness of various options, as well as general guidance on risk reduction strategies
as functions of the observed data structure, are important areas of future research.
The speciﬁcation of (Z,M,R) also impacts the usefulness of the released data, often called data utility
(Duncan et al., 2001; Gomatam et al., 2005; Karr et al., 2006; Woo et al., 2006). Ideally, the data disseminator
quantiﬁes the utility associated with any proposed release strategy. The data set with the best balance of
risk and utility is ultimately selected for release. For partially synthetic data, typically utility is assessed by
comparing inferential quantities—such as conﬁdence intervals for regression coeﬃcients—computed with the
synthetic data to the corresponding quantities computed with the observed data. These measures account
for the magnitude of m through the estimates of uncertainty in the inferences, but they do not formally
incorporate the nature of M and R. Developing quantiﬁable metrics for the utility of the meta-data in M
and R is another area for future research.
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